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European Integration:
Reflections on its Limits and Effects
WILLIAM J. DAVEY*

One of the principal goals of this journal is to evaluate the impact of the
globalization of law, politics, and markets. This article focuses on the
economic integration of markets in Europe, where one aspect of the
"globalization" process-the process by which laws, national economies, and
political systems are becoming ever more entwined and interdependent-has
occurred to the greatest extent, albeit at a regional level. I will first give an
overview of this process and consider the factors that the European
experience in "regionalization" suggests may limit economic and other forms
of integration at the global level. I will then speculate on how the
integration of markets in Europe will change European trade policies and on
how those changes might affect the United States.
I. THE INTEGRATION OF EUROPEAN MARKETS

The twelve countries of the European Community (EC) have gone
further in integrating their national economies than the nations of any other
region.' As a consequence, Europe has already encountered problems
*

Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. B.A. 1971, J.D. 1974, University

of Michigan.
1. There are actually three communities: the European Coal and Steel Community, established
by the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (sometimes referred to as the Treaty
of Paris) on April 18, 1951; the European Economic Community, established by the Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty), which is sometimes referred to as the Treaty of
Rome, on March 25, 1957; and the European Atomic Energy Community, established by the Treaty
Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community on March 25, 1957. The three communities are
commonly called the European Community or the EC. This title would be made official by the Treaty
on European Union (TEU), signed February 7, 1992, at Maastricht, the Netherlands, which would change
the name of the EEC Treaty to the EC Treaty when it comes into effect. Ratification was expected to
occur in 1992, but in a June 1992 referendum, Danish voters narrowly rejected the TEU. A year later,
however, they approved it by a 57%-43% margin. Alan Riding, Unityfor Europe Survives Key Test as
the Danes Vote, N.Y. TiMES, May 19, 1993, at Al. Two days later, the U.K. House of Commons voted
to ratify the TEU. John Darnton, British Lawmakers Approve Pact Forging Greater European Unity,
N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1993, at Al. As of September 1993, the only remaining step for ratification was
resolution of a court challenge to the TEU in Germany. The controversy over the ratification of the TEU
highlights how a community of interests and views is necessary for integration to proceed. See infra text
accompanying notes 91-99. The current text of the EEC Treaty and the relevant provisions of the TEU
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related to integration that other regions and the world as a whole will have
to confront in the not-so-distant future. Indeed, the European experience,
with its various groupings of countries, provides a textbook example of the
types of ever closer integration that are possible and the problems that arise
at the various stages of integration. It is therefore instructive to examine
that experience to see to what extent and how these problems may be
confronted and overcome.
The integration process in Europe can be usefully conceptualized as a
system of concentric circles. 2 The most important circle is that represented
by the European Community, but there are concentric circles both within
and without that circle. For example, within the European Community
circle are such smaller circles as those representing the eleven EC member
states that have agreed to proceed on the harmonization of social policy (all
but the United Kingdom),3 the ten that have agreed in principle on
monetary union (all but the United Kingdom and Denmark)4 and the nine
that have agreed on eliminating border controls amongst themselves (all but
the U.K., Denmark, and Ireland).5
Outside the EC circle, circles can be drawn to represent the various
relationships that the EC has with other European countries and the rest of
the world. The closest outer circle would represent its proposed relationship
with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries (except
Switzerland)6 under the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement.7 The

can be found in GEORGE A. BERMANN, ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMuNITY LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS

(1993).
2.

For a more theoretical discussion of the forms of integration, see BELA BALASSA, THE
Balassa's categories resemble, but do not match
exactly, the forms of integration now existing in Europe.
3. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION [TEU], Feb. 7, 1992, Protocol on Social Policy, in BERMANN,
ET AL., supra note 1.
4. TEU, pt. III, tit. VI, supra note 3; Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reprintedin BERMANN, ET AL., supra note 1, at 191-93;
Decision of the Heads of State and Government, Meeting Within the European Council, Concerning
Certain Problems Raised by Denmark on the Treaty on European Union, § B, 1992 O.J. (C 348) 2.
5. The nine other countries have acted pursuant to the so-called Schengen Agreement, which
is not part of the EC legal framework. EC Commission, Opening Up the Internal Market, EUROPEAN
THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 1-3 (1961).

DOCUMENTATION,

1991, at 30.

6. EFTA is the European Free Trade Association. It was formed in 1960 by most of the
countries of Western Europe that were not in the EC. The text of the convention establishing EFTA can
be found in EFTA SECRETARIAT, THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION 118-38 (3rd ed. 1987). The
current members of EFTA are Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, and
Switzerland. BERMANN, ET AL., supra note 1, at 929.
7. The EEA agreement is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 51-62.
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next would represent the EC's free trade agreements, including the EC-Swiss
Free Trade Agreement, which has already been implemented,8 and the
proposed Europe Agreements with various countries of Eastern Europe,
which will be implemented over the next decade. 9 After that there would
be a circle containing the countries who have entered into various
association agreements with the EC, which typically provide preferential
access to Community markets.1" Finally, the last circle would include the
rest of the EC's trading relationships, including those that are based on the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)."
In this part of the article, I will examine briefly the nature of the EC
itself and the different relationships it has with the rest of Europe, in
particular with respect to trade issues. The focal point of my examination
will be an analysis of the extent to which each relationship results in the
formation of a single market, but I will examine first the institutions, if any,
that govern the relationship. I will also consider the extent to which the
relationships affect certain trade-related matters, such as (i) the reallocation
of resources among member states pursuant to a specific plan, (ii) control
on individual state subsidies and promotion of joint subsidization, and (iii)
significant integration of economic policymaking. One of the more
interesting questions raised by this conceptualization of the globalization
process in Europe is the extent to which there can be a natural progression
to the inner circles by those in the outer circles. I conclude with an analysis
of the limits that may exist on this progression.

8. On the entry of Denmark, Ireland, and the U.K. (all of whom had been EFTA members) into
the EC in 1973, the EC entered into a network of free trade agreements with the remaining members of
EFTA. The EEC-Swiss Free Trade Agreement is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 63-74.
9. These agreements are described infra in the text accompanying notes 64-75.
10. The EC has entered into a wide range of associations or similar arrangements, particularly
with most of the countries surrounding the Mediterranean Sea and Eastern Europe. GEORGE A.
BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 946-48 (1993). The Lom6

Convention, pursuant to which the EC extends preferential trade treatment and aid to about 70 former
colonies and others, can also be viewed as an association agreement. Id. at 948-50. The text of the
fourth and current Lom6 Convention appears at 1993 O.J. (L 229) 3. The EC also extends preferential
tariff treatment to other developing countries under its GSP (Generalized System of Preferences) regime.
BERMANN ET AL., supra, at 950.
11. Included in this group would be the U.S., Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
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A. The European Community
The genesis of the European Community was the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC),12 which created a single market for trade in coal
and steel. The ECSC came into force in 1952 between Belgium, France,
West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Those same six
countries later formed the European Economic Community and the European
3
Atomic Energy Community, which came into effect on January 1, 1958.'
The United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark joined the EC in 1973, Greece
joined in 1981, and Spain and Portugal joined in 1986.14 In this section,
I will sketch the institutional framework of the Community, describe the
internal market that the EC has created and examine several important traderelated aspects of the internal market.
1. EC Institutions
There are five important EC institutions: the Commission, the Council
of Ministers, the Parliament, the Court of Justice, and the European
Council.15 The Commission, which consists of seventeen individuals
appointed by the twelve member states, but not beholden to them, is
essentially the executive branch of the EC. It is charged with the
enforcement of Community law, 16 including the conduct of the
Community's Common Commercial Policy towards third countries,17 and
plays an important role in the Community legislative process as the proposer
of most legislation.1 8 The Council of Ministers, which consists of a
12. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, Apr. 18, 1951,
261 U.N.T.S. 140 (the Treaty of Paris).
13. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957,
98 U.N.T.S. 167.
14. Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession and the Adjustments to the Treaties-Accession
to the European Communities of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 1972 O.J. SPEC. ED. (L 73) 1; Documents
Concerning the Accession of the Hellenic Republic to the European Communities, 1972 O.J. (L 291) 1;
Act Concerning the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the European
Communities, 1985 O.J. (L 302) 1 [hereinafter Act of Accession (Spain & Portugal)].
15. These institutions as they exist now and as they would be modified by the TEU, supra.note
3, are described in BERMANN ET AL., supra note 10, at 50-74.
16.

TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY], Mar. 25,

1957, art. 155, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (the Treaty of Rome).
17. Id. arts. 110-16.
18. See, e.g., id. art. 149.
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representative of each member state, 9 has traditionally been the legislative
branch of the Community.20 In recent years, it has had to share some
legislative power with the Parliament,2 ' which is popularly elected by the
citizens of the various member states.22 Questions of interpretation of
Community law are dealt with by the Court of Justice,23 which has
emerged over the years as a significant force in integrating the Community
by giving an expansive reading to the Treaty's grant of powers to the
Community and by its willingness to rule that member state actions violate
Community law and must be modified. 24 Finally, the European Council,
which consists of the heads of state or government of the member states,
meets from time to time to give direction to the Community institutions and
particularly the Council of Ministers.25 It is where compromises are
typically negotiated on the difficult issues facing the Community.
The existence of these institutions is important. As I will discuss
below,26 the Commission and the Court have, by and large, been the prime
movers in pushing European integration (with support from Parliament),
while the member states acting in the Council of Ministers have often taken
a go-slow approach. It is not clear that integration can realistically proceed
in the absence of permanent institutions actively promoting and overseeing
the process.

19. Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European
Communities, art. 2, 1967 O.J. (L 152) 4. Although the treaty refers only to the "Council," the body is
commonly called the Council of Ministers.
20. EEC TREATY, supra note 16, arts. 145, 149.
21. Id. art. 149; id. arts. 189(a)-(c) (as amended by TEU).
22. Act Concerning the Election of the Representatives of the Assembly by Direct Universal
Suffrage, 1976 O.J. (L 278) 5.
23. EEC TREATY, supra note 16, arts. 164-78.
24. See, e.g., Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [Van
Gend en Loos], 1963 E.C.R. 1, 2 ("[T]he Community constitutes a new legal order of international law
for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights .... [A]ccording to the spirit, the
general scheme and the wording of the Treaty, Article 12 [which prohibited increases in duty rates during
the period in which intra-Community duties were being phased out] must be interpreted as producing
direct effects and creating individual rights which national courts must protect."). The importance of the
Court's role is examined in more detail infra in the text accompanying notes 84-90.
25. The European Council is not mentioned in the EEC Treaty, supra note 16, but it is
institutionalized in the Single European Act, art. 2, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, 2 [hereinafter SEA] and the
TEU, supra note 1, art. D.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 77-90.
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The EC's InternalMarket

The EC has largely succeeded in creating a true internal market in
goods, labor, services, and capital." By 1968, duties on trade in goods
between the member states had been eliminated. Since then the Community
has taken great strides to remove other barriers to free movement and to
harmonize laws to promote cross-border commerce.28 Its march toward the
creation of an internal market has not been a steady one, however. For
much of the late 1970s and early 1980s, relatively little progress was made
at the legislative level because of the inability of the Council to reach
consensus on many Commission proposals. Indeed, during this period it
was largely through expansive Court of Justice decisions that continued
progress was made towards realizing the internal market goal. 29 The Court
ruled, for example, that normally a good lawfully marketed in one member
state could be marketed in the others, notwithstanding local restrictions that
purported to limit such marketing possibilities.3 a While this ruling could
be used by individuals to challenge many indirect member state restrictions
on intra-Community trade,31 it was not a panacea for the creation of the
internal market. By its nature, the Court's role was limited to striking down
member state barriers to trade. It could not force adoption of positive
legislation needed to complete the internal market.
in 1985, inspired by a Commission White Paper on the completion of
the internal market, the member states agreed upon amendments to the basic
treaties in the Single European Act, which came into force in 1987.32 The
Single European Act set December 31, 1992, as a goal for completion of the
internal market.33 The Act helped make that goal realistic by amending the

See generally BERMANN ET AL., supra note 10, at 315-625.
The history of this process is sketched briefly in id. at 432-47.
See generally Martin Shapiro, The European Court of Justice, in EUROPOLITICS:
INSTITUTIONS AND POLICYMAKING IN THE "NEw" EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 123 (Alberta M. Sbragia ed.,
1992).
30. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein [Cassis de
Dijon], 1979 E.C.R. 649, 664.
31. The Cassis de Dijon case, id., involved French cassis barred from Germany because its
alcoholic content was too low. Other cases successfully challenged German restrictions on beer imports
not conforming to the German beer purity law, Case 178/64, Commission v. Federal Republic of
Germany [German Beer], 1987 E.C.R. 1227, and Italian rules on the composition of pasta, Case 407/85,
3 Glocken GmbH v. U.S.L Centro-Sud, 1988 E.C.R. 4233.
32. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 10, at 432-36; see SEA, supra note 25.
33. Id. art. 8(a).
27.
28.
29.
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legislative process so that a form of super ("qualified") majority voting,
instead of unanimity, was made the rule for most measures necessary to
complete the internal market.34 Spurred on by studies showing the great
economic costs imposed on the EC by the lack of an internal market,3 5 the
vast majority of the 1992 internal market program was agreed to on
schedule.36
As a result, the EC has come close to creating a completely free and
open internal market amongst its member states. Goods move freely, and
so do workers. Where professional qualifications are an issue, there are
rules on recognition of diplomas.37 Services can be provided freely
throughout the Community. Where they are regulated (such as insurance
and banking), there are Community rules indicating which member state is
allowed to regulate which service providers, and on what types of services
substantive regulations may be imposed. 38 As importantly, where divergent
member state laws could impede the flow of goods from one member to
another (e.g., different rules on labeling), the Community has often required
the member states to adopt a single, community-wide rule. 39 From the
outset, the treaty established rules on competition, which are enforced by the
Commission.40

34. EEC TREATY, supra note 16, art. 100(a). Under this so-called "qualified majority" voting
system, the various member states cast votes in rough proportion to their populations and a measure is
adopted if it receives 54 out of a total of 76 votes. Id. art. 148(2). Effectively, this means that more
than two member states must oppose a proposal for it to be defeated since the largest four member states
(France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom) have only 10 votes each.
35. See generally PAOLA CECCHINI ET AL., THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGE 1992: THE BENEFITS
OF A SINGLE MARKET (John Robinson trans., 1988).

36.

As of December 1992, 95% of the measures identified for completion of the internal market

had been adopted at the Community level, while the implementation rate at the member state level was
80%. Violations of EC Single Market Laws Said Not to be Prosecutedfor Now, 10 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 137, (Jan. 27, 1993).
37. Council Directive 89/48 of 21 December 1988 on a General System for the Recognition of
Higher-Education Diplomas Awarded on Completion of Professional Education and Training of at Least
Three Years' Duration, 1989 O.J. (L 19) 16.

38. See, e.g., Second Council Directive 89/646 of 15 December 1989 on the Coordination of
Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business
of Credit Institutions and Amending Directive 77/780/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1.
39. See, e.g., Council Directive 79/831 of 18 September 1979 Amending for the Sixth Time
Directive 67/548 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating
to the Classification, Packaging and Labelling of Dangerous Substances, 1979 O.J. (L 259) 10; Council

Directive 85/374 of 25 July 1985 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative
Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29.
40.

EEC TREATY, supra note 16, arts. 85-86, 89. See generally BERMANN ET AL., supra note

10, at 630-888.
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Consequently, the European Community epitomizes the globalization
process in respect of trade at the regional level.4' While there may be
other actions it could take that might increase trade even more, it is
probably near the limits of market integration. There is more to
globalization than trade issues, however, and there is much more to the
Community as well. In this paper, however, I will consider only a few
other trade-related aspects of EC integration.42
3. Additional Trade-RelatedAspects of EC Integration
In addition to removing trade barriers, there are several other significant
trade-related aspects of Community integration. First, market integration
sharply highlights disparities in regional wealth and the trade-related
consequences that may result therefrom.43 Richer countries will be
concerned about possible job losses to poorer regions where wage rates are
lower and environmental rules less strictly enforced;' poorer countries will
feel entitled to assistance in implementing common policies proposed by
richer countries or may simply insist on such help as a price for supporting
new Community initiatives.4 5 Accordingly, the Community has adopted
mechanisms to reduce these disparities by transferring wealth from the richer
member states to the poorer ones.4 6 In some ways, this aid simply reflects

41. In some of the areas described in this article, the EC has integrated its markets beyond U.S.
practice. For example, the U.S. rules on recognition of professional diplomas (see Council Directive
89/48, supra note 37), banking (see Council Directive 89/646, supra note 38), and products liability (see
Council Directive 85/374, supra note 39) vary on a state by state basis, and consequently are not as
uniform as the analogous rules will be in the EC.
42. The TEU, for example, has provisions on a common foreign and security policy, TEU, supra
note 3, at tit. V, and provisions on cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs, id., tit. VI.
43. In the case of the EC, for example, the per capita GDP of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal is
less than 75% of the EC average. EC Commission, Helping Europe's Regions, EUROPEAN FILE, 1992,
no. 5(a).
44. As this paper is written, a proposal by the Hoover company to close a plant in France and
open one in Scotland is receiving much attention in the European press. Europe's Single Market:
Labour Pains, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 6, 1993, at 71; France & Britain: In Love, Really, THE
ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 1993, at 59.
45. At the December 1992 Edinburgh European Council meeting, it appeared that Spanish
agreement on various issues was predicated on acceptance by the richer member states of a significant
increase in the structural funds, which are designed to aid poorer regions. Claymores at the Ready, THE
ECONOMIST, Dec. 5, 1992, at 56; European Community: CheeryFaces, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 19, 1992,
at 48. See generally Gary Marks, StructuralPolicy in the EuropeanCommunity, in EUROPOLITICS, supra
note 29, at 191.
46. The poorer countries of the EC have pushed very strongly for expansion of intra-Community
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the traditions behind general foreign aid programs. What is interesting,
however, is the extent to which this assistance, which goes from rich
countries to near rich countries, may divert aid from poor countries."7
Second, market integration necessitates that joint policies be adopted
with respect to subsidization of industry. These policies include (i) limits
on the rights of individual member states to subsidize local producers, which
would distort trade patterns in the internal market and lead to wasteful
competitive subsidization,48 and (ii) adoption of common strategies of
increasing overall community wealth through government action, whether
this be coordinated infrastructure developments or joint aid to specific
industries.49 The Community over time has become more and more active
in pursuing such policies.
Third, as economies become more closely intertwined, economic
conditions in one country inevitably have more of an effect in the others that
are most closely connected to it. Economic policy decisions taken by one
government affect others, sometimes in fundamental ways. Consequently,
market integration increases pressures for coordination of economic policies.
To date, the extent of such economic policy coordination in the EC has been
rather limited, but under the Maastricht Treaty, ten of the member states (all
but Denmark and the U.K.) have committed themselves to move toward a
common currency and a European central bank. If that occurs, then those
member states' economies will clearly be closely intertwined on other
economic policy matters as well (particularly fiscal policy and budget
deficits).5 °

aid funds. At the December 1992 Edinburgh European Council meeting, it was agreed to increase the
so-called structural funds from 21 billion ECU in 1993 to 30 billion in 1999. European Council in
Edinburgh-]11-12December 1992-Conclusionsof the Presidency,EUROPE, Dec. 13, 1992, at 5, 12 (no.
5878, spec. ed.).
47. See infra text accompanying notes 138-42.
48. The EC controls so-called state aids by prohibiting some and regulating others. EEC
TREATY, supra note 16, arts. 90-92. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 10, at 884-87. Interestingly, the
United States does not attempt to limit competition among states for industry, although state subsidization
of foreign investment has been controversial. William E. Schmidt, What the States are Doing for
Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1989, at E2.
49. See EEC TREATY, supra note 16, arts. 129(a)-30, 130(f)-(p) (as amended by TEU). The
EC's research program, which is designed to make EC industry more competitive vis-A-vis the United
States and Japan, has been budgeted at 5.7 billion ECU for the 1990-94 period. EC Commission, The
European Community 1992 and Beyond, EUROPEAN DOCUMENTATION, 1991, at 11.
50. EEC TREATY, supra note 16, pt. III, tit. VI (as amended by TEU). See BERMANN ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 1193-1205.
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The internal market of the EC is largely integrated and that has led to
integration on other levels as well. The intensity or depth of EC integration
can be compared with what will become the next most "intense" trading
arrangement in Europe-the proposed European Economic Area.
B. The European Economic Area
The European Economic Area (EEA) is expected to come into existence
in 1993 between the EC and the EFTA countries (except Switzerland, where
a referendum rejected EEA membership). 5
It is, in some senses, a
halfway house between the former free trade area arrangements between the
EC and the individual EFTA members, and full EC membership. In fact,
negotiations on EC membership began in 1993 between the EC and Austria,
Finland, Norway, and Sweden. 52 A brief examination of the EEA
Agreement is instructive because it demonstrates a somewhat less intensive
level of integration than found in the EC itself.
1. EEA Institutions
At the institutional level, the EEA differs fundamentally from the EC in
that it does not have institutions with general decision-making or
enforcement authority.5 3 Decisionmaking is generally done by a joint
committee, in which each of the two sides-the EC and the EFTA
states-has one vote, which means that consensus is required. Decisions on
whether new or revised EC legislation will be incorporated into the EEA
Agreement will be made by consensus.54 Consequently, there will be less
institutional pressure toward market integration than there is in the EC.

51. The text of the EEA agreement can be found in Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area
[EEA Agreement] 63 C.M.L.R. 921 (1992).
52. European Council in Edinburgh, supra note 46, at 2, 5-6.
53. Sven Norberg, The Agreement on a European Economic Area, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
1171, 1180 (1992). The EEA Agreement does create an enforcement institution in the area of
competition law, but it essentially will be concerned with competition law matters in the EFTA states.
It does not have general EEA-wide authority. EEA Agreement, supra note 51, arts. 55-57, 108-10.
54. EEA Agreement, supra note 51, arts. 93(2), 98, 103. The two parties that must reach
consensus are the EC and the EFTA states speaking with one voice.
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2. Internal Market
The EEA Agreement essentially provides for the same degree of free
movement of goods, workers, services, and capital that is provided for in the
EEC Treaty, with only a few exceptions.55 The principal exception is with
respect to agricultural and fisheries products.5 6 In addition to provisions
directly related to free movement, the EEA Agreement provides that the
EFTA countries will harmonize their internal laws with a wide range of EC
legislation."
Thus, on the level of the internal market, the EEA
arrangement is not much different than the EC and the language used in the
EEA Agreement is often taken directly from the EEC Treaty.58 As noted
above, the level of harmonization agreed upon was that then existing within
the EC. The EEA countries must agree to be bound by new or revised EC
rules, which means that the scope of the EEA internal market will diverge
from that of the EC internal market in the absence of such agreement. I
would anticipate that such divergences will occur because I believe that the
EEA countries will not always be able to agree, especially since there is no
institution that is charged with promoting EEA-EC integration.
3. Trade-RelatedAspects of the EEA
A comparison of the trade-related aspects of the EEA with the analogous
EC arrangements reveals some significant similarities and differences with
respect to aid and economic coordination. The EEA Agreement does not
establish a mechanism for funding aid transfers within the EEA. It does,
however, obligate the EFTA countries to make substantial contributions to
a "cohesion fund" that will be used to aid the poorer EC members." With
respect to subsidization, the EEA Agreement imposes limits on state aids
similar to those in the EEC Treaty.60 Furthermore, it requires EEA
members to engage in EC projects to subsidize certain target industries.61

55. See id. arts. 8-16, 28-45.
56. Id. arts. 17-20. There are also special provisions on steel and coal, and transportation. Id.
arts. 27, 47-52.
57. Id. pts. V, VI.
58. CompareEEC TREATY, supra note 16, art. 30, with EEA Agreement, supranote 51, art. 11.
59. EEA Agreement, supra note 51, arts. 115-17.
60. Compare id. arts. 61-64, with EEC TREATY, supra note 16, arts. 90-92.
61. EEA Agreement, supra note 51, pt. VI.
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Finally, with respect to economic and monetary coordination, the EEA
Agreement provides only for the exchange of views and information on the
conduct of economic and monetary policy.6"
C. The Free Trade Agreements
The EC has entered into free trade agreements with most of Europe.
The twenty-year-old agreements with the EFTA countries will be replaced
by the EEA Agreement (except for Switzerland)63 while the recently
negotiated free trade agreements with Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia (the so-called Europe Agreements),
when ratified, will be implemented over the next ten years.'
These
agreements provide for relatively little market integration, particularly in
comparison with the EEA. Indeed, the Europe Agreements are seen as a
temporary stage in the relationship between the EC and the countries of
Eastern Europe-one that will last only until they are ready to enter the
EEA (or an analogous relationship), with full membership in the EC perhaps
possible after the turn of the century." There are no significant institutions
created by these Agreements, although there are provisions for regular
meetings of the parties.

62. Id. art. 46.
63. The EEC-Swiss Free Trade Agreement can be found in Council Regulation 2840/72, 1972
O.J. SPEC. ED. 190, 194 [hereinafter EC-Swiss FTA].
64. The provisions of the Europe Agreements that are of interest for this analysis are essentially
the same in each of the agreements. I will refer to the Europe Agreement between the EC and Hungary
for illustration purposes. EC Commission, EC-Hungary Interim Agreement (June 12, 1991) (unpublished
treaty, on file with the INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES) [hereinafter EC-Hungary
Agreement]. The EC has entered into Interim Agreements, which essentially implement the trade aspects
of the Europe Agreements, pending ratification of the Europe Agreements themselves. Council Decision
92/228/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 114) 1 (Poland); Council Decision 92/229/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 115) 1 (Czech
and Slovak Federal Republic); Council Decision 92/230/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 116) 1 (Hungary); Council
Decision 93/186/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 81) 1 (Romania).
65. In a report prepared for the December 1992 Edinburgh European Council meeting, the
Commission urged the Council to confirm that it has accepted the goal of eventual membership for the
countries of Eastern and Central Europe, but noted that establishing a timetable would be premature. EC
Commission, Towards a Closer Association with the Countries ofCentral and Eastern Europe, reprinted
in EUR. DOCUMENTS, Dec. 9, 1992, at 1, 3 (no. 1814).
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1. Internal Market
The Europe Agreements establish free movement of goods in
principle,6 6 but for the moment there are significant exceptions. Not only
agricultural products, but also steel and textile products, are subject to
limitations on import into the EC.67 Indeed, John Fleming, chief economist
at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, estimates that
fully one-third to one-half of the items in which these former members of
the Soviet bloc have a significant export interest are controlled.6 8
With respect to the other freedoms found in the EEC Treaty and the
EEA Agreement-free movement of workers, services, and capital-the
Europe Agreements have less far reaching provisions. While there are
provisions on the protection of workers already working in the EC, there is
no right granted for the free movement of workers to the EC. 69 The
Agreements do call for significant free movement in services and for the
right of establishment,70 but free movement of capital is limited to current
payments and direct investments."
The Agreements do not generally require harmonization of laws,
although they encourage it, with the Commission suggesting that the first
areas considered should be competition, customs, and intellectual property
rules.72 It should be noted, however, that to the extent that these countries
wish to join the EC (and they do), it is likely that they will engage in their
own harmonization programs, regardless of whether required by any
agreement, so as to ease their eventual accession negotiations.

66.

See, e.g., EC-Hungary Agreement, supra note 64, art. 7; EC-Swiss FTA, supra note 63, arts.

67.
68.

EC-Hungary Agreement, supra note 64, art. 15.
Richard W. Stevenson, East Europeans Complain About Trade Barriers,N.Y. TIMES, Jan.

3-14.

25, 1992, at Al, A5.
69. EC-Hungary Agreement, supra note 64, art. 37. See EC-Swiss FTA, supra note 63,
Declaration Concerning Workers, at 281.
70. EC-Hungary Agreement, supra note 64, arts. 44, 55. There are no comparable provisions
in the EC-Swiss FTA, supra note 63, although the EC does have other agreements with Switzerland that
deal with some of these issues. See, e.g., Council Decision 91/370, 1991 O.J. (L 205) 2 (concerning an

agreement with Switzerland on direct insurance (other than life insurance)).
71. EC-Hungary Agreement, supra note 64, arts. 59-60. See also EC-Swiss FTA, supra note
63, art. 19 (current payments).
72. EC-Hungary Agreement, supra note 64, arts. 67-68; see EC Commission, supra note 65.
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2. Other Trade-RelatedAspects of Europe Agreements
The Europe Agreements have no provisions on subsidization (except for
some limits on state aids)" and have only very general clauses on
economic coordination.74 They do, however, provide for aid from the
EC.

75

D. Other Trade Arrangements
The EC has a number of so-called association agreements with European
and Mediterranean countries and has a preferential trading arrangement-the
Lom6 Convention-with many of its member states' former colonies.
Although the terms of these agreements vary, they do not provide for any
significant market integration and are, accordingly, not of particular interest
to the analysis in this article.76
E. Lessons from European Economic Integration
The recent history of Europe presents a textbook study of how economic
integration proceeds. In particular, it suggests (i) that there are certain
criteria that must be met before it is possible to move from one level of
economic integration to the next, and (ii) that there may be basic
sociopolitical factors that limit the economic integration process.
1. Requirementsfor Integration
The experience of the EC suggests that there are at least two basic
requirements for successful market integration to occur. First, there must be
institutions with meaningful powers that have integration as one of their
fundamental goals. To achieve this, there needs to be both an institution

73. EC-Hungary Agreement, supra note 64, art. 62; EC-Swiss FTA, supra note 63, art. 25
(limiting certain state aids).
74. EC-Hungary Agreement, supra note 64, arts. 70-96. The EC-Swiss agreement does not call
for any economic policy coordination. See EC-Swiss FTA, supra note 63.
75. EC-Hungary Agreement, supranote 64, arts. 98-103. The current aid programs for Eastern
Europe are described in UCVIth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities 1992,
Commission of the European Communities, at 255-57 (1993).
76.

See generally BERMANN ET AL., supra note 10, at 946-64.
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that affirmatively promotes market integration and one that effectively
enforces the integrating rules that are adopted. Second, there must be some
minimum degree of commonality of interests (for example, economic,
environmental, and social) among the countries that are attempting to
integrate their markets. In the case of the EC, both of these requirements
have been met.
Much of the success of the EC can be attributed to the existence of
formal institutions at the European level that have pressed the case for
further integration and that have taken steps to encourage and enforce
integration. In particular, the Commission has served throughout most of
the EC's history as a promarket-integration force." Even when progress
toward the single market was slow, the Commission continued to push for
it. The actions of the Commission must be compared to the actions of the
member states, acting individually or through the Council. By and large, the
member states have often opposed expansive interpretations of the EEC
Treaty, and in particular the powers of the Community and the supremacy
of Community law.78 They also tend to reflect parochial national interests
in decisionmaking.79 This has not been true of all member states all of the
time, but even the member states that, on a general level, have endorsed a
strong and expanding Community have often opposed strength in the
Community in specific cases when issues of particular concern to them were
at stake.8" Thus, the existence of an institution like the Commission that
has integration as a primary goal would seem to be a virtual prerequisite to
market integration.8 Without such an institution, the natural tendencies of
nations to resist incursions on their sovereignty (or detriments to groups in
their populations) will greatly retard progress toward integration. This
conclusion is underlined by the EC-EFTA experience, where the lack of

77. B. Guy Peters, BureaucraticPolitics and the Institutions of the European Community, in
EUROPOLITICS, supra note 29, at 75, 85.
78. For example, member state governments filed briefs opposed to giving the EEC Treaty direct
effect in the Van Gend en Loos case, supra note 24. More recently, at least some of the member states
have tended to oppose broad readings of the Community's powers (see, e.g., Opinion 1/78, International
Agreement on Rubber, 1979 E.C.R. 2871) and have tended to support Treaty interpretations that restrict
the availability of nonunanimous voting. See, e.g., Case 45/86, Commission v. Council, 1987 E.C.R.
1493 (generalized tariff preferences); BERMANN ET AL., supra note 10, at 88-89.
79. Peters, supra note 77, at 78-79.
80. See, e.g., German Beer, supra note 3 1.
81. Peters notes, however, that institutions are not sufficient by themselves to ensure integration.
He cites the importance of effective leaders, among other factors. Peters, supra note 77, at 121-22.
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meaningful institutions was viewed as a hindrance to integration.82 The
EEA Agreement represents an improvement over the cooperation based on
the EC-EFTA free trade agreements, but it does not provide for the transfer
of any sovereign powers to EEA institutions and does not limit the power
of decision of the parties.83 Intensification of integration in simple free
trade areas may be expected to proceed slowly.
As important as effective institutions are as a driving force for
integration, there is also a need for an institution to ensure that the rules
providing for integration are enforced.'
In the case of the EC, the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) has played a critical role in that regard.
From its early decisions that established the right of individuals to invoke
Community law in national courts,85 and the supremacy of Community
rules over national rules,86 to far-reaching decisions striking down
disguised barriers to trade, 7 the ECJ has played a critical role in the
integration process. It seems clear that integration would have proceeded
at a much slower pace, but for the ECJ.8 8 In most of its path-breaking
decisions, the member states (or some of them) were opposed to the position
taken by the ECJ. 89 Yet, they ultimately accepted the decision, suggesting
that their opposition was not fundamental but that some institutional
mechanism to overcome it was required. The ECJ has proved to be
effective in that role. 90
The second requirement for market integration is a certain degree of
commonality between participants in the market. 9' This is not to say that
82. Norberg, supra note 53, at 1197 (Experience in the EC-EFTA relationship demonstrated that
"creation of a dynamic and homogenous EEA would require ... a strong institutional framework[,]
especially with regard to legal institutions[,] be created... ."). See also David O'Keeffe, The Agreement
on the European Economic Area, I LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1, 3 (1992).
83. Armando T. Laredo, The EEA Agreement: An Overall View, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
1199, 1204 (1992).
84. For a general discussion of the importance of having a dispute settlement system that
enforces agreed upon trading rules, see William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GA TT, 11 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 51, 65-81 (1987).
85. see Van Gend en Loos, supra note 24.
86. Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., 1978 E.C.R.
629.
87. See Cassis de Dijon, supra note 30.
88. Shapiro, supra note 29, at 123.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
90. Shapiro, supra note 29, at 154-56. On the subject of the role of the ECJ and law in the
integration process, see generally COURTS AND FREE MARKETS, TERRANCE SANDALOW & ERIC STEIN
EDS. (1982); MAURO CAPPELLETrI ET AL., INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW (1986).
91. ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
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countries have to be at identical levels of economic development with
similar views on economic, environmental, and social issues generally. But
there is a need to have some degree of congruence. In the case of the EC,
there is variance in the levels of development of the various member states
which has caused problems. But, as noted above, they have been reduced
through the provision of substantial aid from the richer countries to the
poorer ones.92 Without such a process, one can wonder whether the
Community would have integrated to the extent that it has, since there
probably would have been more serious disputes over many issues. In
particular, the use of mutual recognition as a market unifying principle, both
by the Court and in Community legislation, would have been much more
restricted if the member states varied too widely in their approaches to
regulating markets.93 As important, the free movement of workers, which
is a fundamental part of an integrated market, is unlikely to be accepted if
there are significant variations in the wealth of the constituent members,
since such variation will likely lead to significant, and potentially socially
destabilizing, migration. 94
2. The Limitations on Integration
The EC is already having to confront the question of whether there are
natural limits on economic or market integration. In essence, these potential
limits seem to stem from a lack of a commonly accepted agreement between
the various member states as to what policies need to be integrated in order
to achieve an optimal level of market integration, while respecting national

OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 71-72 (1991).

92. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
93. Following the Cassis de Dijon decision in 1979 (see supra text accompanying note 30), the
Commission issued a communication in which it highlighted what it viewed as the Court's acceptance
of what has been called the "mutual trust" principle, which is that "if one State's rules allow a product
to be marketed, all other States should have confidence in the first State's judgment and likewise allow
the product to be marketed." BERMANN, ET AL., supra note 10, at 357. This concept is regarded as a
"key to attaining an integrated internal market." Id. Obviously, if there are significant differences
between states, this principle may be viewed as unacceptable and market integration as a consequence
will be much more difficult to achieve.
94. Although Spain and Portugal joined the EC in 1986, the rules on free movement of workers
became applicable only in 1993 (1995 in respect to Luxembourg). Act of Accession (Spain & Portugal),
supra note 14, art. 56. As noted earlier, the EC's agreements with the countries of Eastern Europe do
not provide for free movement of workers (see supra text accompanying note 69), although the EEA
agreement does. See supra text accompanying note 55.

GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL

[Vol. 1: 185

sovereignty. The lack of agreement appears at two levels: disagreements
over the need to harmonize certain policies at all; and disagreements about
what is the proper balance between harmonization and the rights of
individual member states (or subdivisions thereof) to make their own,
independent decisions on matters directly affecting them.
An example of a basic policy disagreement over the need for integration
of a specific policy would be the U.K. decision to eschew monetary union
and the social policy provisions to which others agreed at Maastricht.9" As
the number of member states expands, such differences may be expected to
occur more often.96 Fear of such a result has animated those who argue
that the current Community should be "deepened" before it is "widened."97
In light of the decision to open accession negotiations with Austria, Finland,
Norway, and Sweden, it seems that the forces in favor of widening the
Community first have won. Time will tell whether in fact a widened
Community will be a less integrated one.
The second type of disagreement presents more fundamental problems
and may arise even if there is fairly broad agreement on the general outlines
of all major policies among the member states. This type of disagreement
stems from the desire of local communities to have some say over matters
that affect their quality of life directly. It is not about the desirability of
eliminating "red tape" at borders or standardizing essentially mechanical
details, such as the characteristics of basic products, but rather about such
topics as the appropriate level of environmental protection. For example,
all member states may agree on the need to regulate air pollution, but one
or more may feel that it wants stricter standards than the ones to which the
others are willing to agree. The current debate over "subsidiarity" highlights
this problem. 98 As discussed below, 9 drawing the line between what

95. See supra text accompanying notes 3-5.
96. In particular, it seems likely that there will be differences over the extent to which the
Common Foreign and Security Policy should be expanded, since several of the prospective member states
have traditions of neutrality (e.g., Austria and Sweden). European Community: A Strange New Pattern
of Stars, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 6, 1993, at 56.
97. France has traditionally favored deepening (further integrating) the Community before
widening (increasing the number of countries) it, while the U.K. has favored the opposite approach, in
part because of an apparent belief that a wider Community will not be as deep, which is at least the goal
of the current Conservative government. For a description of the evolution of this debate, see Survival
of the Fattest,THE ECONOMIST, April 11, 1992, at 54; A FinalFling, THE ECONOMIST, May 23, 1992,
at 52; If a Non Comes Next, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 19, 1992, at 60; The Mandarins' Moment, THE
ECONOMIST, Dec. 19, 1992, at 16.
98. In an attempt to address this problem, the TEU would amend the EEC Treaty by adding a
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should be regulated at the Community level and what may be done at the
local level will probably preoccupy the Community in the coming years and
will serve as a limit on further integration.
The process of European integration is instructive for those thinking
about the future of the globalization process in the world at large, both
economically and otherwise. Much of the globalization process is driven by
factors beyond the control of governments, but the European experience
suggests that such factors alone are not enough to maintain momentum
toward a truly integrated global economy. It suggests, in particular, that the
process needs institutions to push it forward and that even with relatively
strong institutions, there are fundamental limits on the process imposed by
desires for local autonomy over certain issues. On a practical level, it
suggests that further integration of the world economy of the sort epitomized
by GATT's Uruguay Round agenda may only be practical if combined with
stronger institutions for rulemaking and improved dispute settlement
procedures for rule enforcement." ° But such changes are precisely those
that are strenuously opposed by groups seeking local autonomy.' ' These
factors suggest that the process of globalization may proceed more slowly
in the near future than it has in the recent past.
II. THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
ON THE UNITED STATES

The continuing economic integration of Europe will significantly affect
the United States in many ways. In this part, I highlight some of those
new Article 3b, which would provide in part:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action,
in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
BERMANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 109. While much has been written about this principle, it is not clear
how it will be implemented in practice. An October 27, 1992, communication from the Commission to
the Council and Parliament on the subsidiarity principle is reproduced at The Subsidiarity Principle,
BULL. EC 10-1992, at 116-26.
99. See infra text accompanying notes 116-17.
100. See JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GAT SYSTEM (1990); Davey, supra note 84.
101. In the United States, opposition to the Uruguay Round agreements and the proposal to
establish a Multilateral Trade Organization has come from environmental groups worried about the rights
of countries to adopt trade restricting environmental measures without penalty. See, e.g., WASH. POST,
April 22, 1992, at Al8 (advertisement sponsored by, inter alia, Public Citizen and the Sierra Club,
decrying "sneak attack on democracy" under guise of free trade).
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effects. I start by explaining why I expect the EC to become more
independent and more self-centered in the coming years. Then I explore
how those two changes will likely affect EC relations with the United States.
Finally, I conclude with a brief evaluation of how completion of the 1992
internal market program will affect U.S.-EC trade.
A. General Changes in European Attitudes
In the near term, I think that two general changes will take place in
European attitudes. First, with the decline of the Communist threat and the
increased economic strength of a unified internal market, Europe will
become more independent and less concerned with maintaining close
relations with the United States. Second, as the EC integration process
continues, as it adds member states, and as power balances shift within it,
the EC nations will become more preoccupied with their own problems and
less concerned with non-European matters generally.
1. GreaterEuropean Independence
Europe as a whole is likely to feel and to act more independently than
it has in the past for a number of reasons: the reduced threat of
Communism, increased EC economic strength, and less willingness to
negotiate internationally on compromises reached at the EC level (an EC
version of, or reaction to, the U.S. unilateralism that it detests).
Consequently, the United States is likely to find that the EC and its member
states will be more difficult to deal with in the coming years.
First, the end of the Cold War and of the threat from the East greatly
reduces Europe's need to rely on the United States militarily.'0 2 This is
not to say, of course, that there will be no military problems in Europe, or
that the EC and its member states will be particularly effective in dealing
with them. Yugoslavia proves the contrary, and there are other potentially
explosive tinderboxes as well. 0 3 But even if U.S. help is desired to
102. This reduced need is demonstrated by the planned reduction in U.S. force levels in Europe
(from 340,000 in 1988 to 100,000 in 1996). Peter T. Kilbourn, Gorbachev Plan Seen Helping Deficit,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1988, at A20; MilitaryPlanfor CuttingServices Falls FarShort of Clinton's Vision,
N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 13, 1993, at 9.
103. As of this writing, EC intervention in the fighting in the former Yugoslavia has been viewed
as relatively ineffective. Air Drop on Bosnia: America's Risk; Europe's Failure,THE ECONOMIST, Feb.
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provide otherwise difficult-to-organize air and logistical support, the United
States will probably be allowed to play only a much reduced role in
European security affairs."° Indeed, there is some doubt about whether
the United States will be willing to play much of a role in any event.' °5
In trade and economic matters, this reduced U.S. role will simply mean that
for the United States, the EC will likely be more difficult to deal with.
Neither the United States nor the EC will any longer have the impetus of
maintaining unity for purposes of the Cold War to push them toward
resolving their economic differences.
Second, European independence will also be enhanced by the EC's
While signs of a new cycle of
increased economic strength.
"Europessimism" are already starting to emerge in Europe, 10 6 I think that
the integration of the EC's internal market and the expansion of that market
to include the EFTA countries (minus Switzerland) will ultimately
strengthen the European economy, as its supporters have always
claimed."0 7 This will likely make the EC more assertive in economic
matters.
Finally, European desires to act independently will be boosted because
more and more decisions made at the European level will involve so many
difficult compromises within the EC, that the EC will be less able or willing
to change those policies in negotiations with the United States and other
This, combined with a long simmering
affected trading partners.'

27, 1993, at 16. The political uncertainty in Russia provides an example of a potential future problem.
Thomas L. Friedman, Bush Cites Limits on Aid to Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1992, at Al.
104. See Why NATO?, THE ECONOMIST, May 23, 1992, at IS.
105. See supra note 102.
106. See Hans-Peter Frohlich & Martin Wolf, Survey of the EuropeanSingle Market, FIN. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 1993, at IV; Angelo M. Codevilla, The Euromess, COMMENTARY, Feb. 1993, at 37.
107. See supra text accompanying note 35.
108. Thomas R. Howell et al., European Community, in CONFLICT AMONG NATIONS: TRADE
POLICIES IN THE 1990s 389, 402 (Thomas R. Howell et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter CONFLICT AMONG
NATIONS]. This problem arose in the U.S.-EC negotiations over agriculture in late 1992, where the
Commission apparently did not have the authority to negotiate an agreement with the U.S. that changed
the internal EC agreement on agricultural reform reached in May 1992. There has been considerable
controversy in the EC over whether the Commission in fact stayed within those limits in reaching an
agreement with the United States. The Uruguay Round: Coupe de Grace, Coupe de Foudre, THE
ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1992, at 70. Since nonmembers had no role in the internal EC negotiations, the
refusal to allow international negotiations to change the result of the internal negotiations is effectively
a refusal to negotiate internationally.
On a more general level, there is room for debate over whether the existence of an organization like
the EC, which speaks for 12 member states, makes international trade negotiations easier or more
difficult. On the one hand, the objecting voice of one member state may be voted down by the others
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European resentment of U.S. unilateralism in trade and other matters, 0 9
will result in a much more independent minded Europe in the years ahead.
These factors leading to increased European independence in economic
and other matters must be considered in conjunction with other factors that
will cause the EC to be more inward-looking in the years ahead.
2. An Inward-Looking Europe
In the next decade, I believe that Europe will be preoccupied with its
own problems and less concerned with problems outside of Europe. There
will likely be a multitude of critical internal problems that EC members will
have to face, particularly with respect to how an expanded EC will function.
First, there will be the issue of how to incorporate the EFTA countries
into the EC. I suspect that the negotiations will not be all that difficult, but
in some areas there may be some problems."'
While those problems
should be solved by the mid-1990s, a new problem of what to do with the
advanced East European countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland) will then have to be faced."' This new problem will be more
difficult. It will, however, be followed by ever more difficult accession
issues, as more and more of the countries of Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union seek admission or special status with the EC. These problems
will persist for years, and they will inevitably demand considerable time and
attention from the Community leaders responsible for dealing with foreign
affairs and commercial policy. One consequence will be less time and
energy to spend on solving economic problems with the non-European
world. Indeed, some blame the slow progress in the Uruguay Round of

in the EC's internal deliberations, while such a country on its own could prevent the necessary consensus
from being formed in GATT negotiations. See Frederick M. Abbott, Integration Without Institutions:
The NAFTA Mutation of the EC Model and the Future of the GA7T Regime, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 917
(1992). On the other hand, as noted above, once an organization like the EC reaches a compromise
position internally, its negotiators may be denied any room to maneuver in the negotiations.
109. See, e.g., EC Commission, REPORT ON UNITED STATES TRADE AND INVESTMENT BARRIERS,
1992 (issued annually by the EC in response to a similar U.S. report criticizing U.S. trading partners,
including the EC).
110. Among the difficult issues in the accession negotiations will be agricultural and fisheries
issues, institutional structure, and the extent to which the newcomers will join in the new common
policies under the TEU (monetary union, defense). European Community: A Strange New Pattern of
Stars, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 6, 1993, at 56.
111. See EC Commission, Towards a Closer Association with the Countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, supra note 65.
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GATT negotiations in part on EC preoccupation with the Maastricht Treaty
and the German preoccupation with former East Germany." 2
Second, considerable attention by EC leaders will have to be given to
the extent to which the EC is going to become Europe Ala carte.' 13 This
process, sometimes called two-speed Europe, has already started to occur.
The U.K. did not join the Maastricht agreement on social policy; the U.K.
and Denmark have, to an extent, opted out of the proposed monetary union;
the U.K., Denmark, and Ireland have not yet joined the Schengen
Agreement group on elimination of internal border controls.1 4 I think that
this trend will continue; some of the accession candidates have already
expressed interest in negotiating terms similar to what Denmark and the
U.K. have obtained." 5 While these problems can and will be solved, it
will again, I think, require a lot of time and attention from Community
leaders.
Third, the problem of subsidiarity is going to preoccupy the EC in the
coming years." 6 This is related to the Europe 4 la carte problem, but it
is more pervasive. Since in virtually all areas of Community activity,
arguments will be made that, under the subsidiarity principle, more
discretion should be given to national or local governments. The extent of
this problem can be seen in the Commission's first reaction to it. In its list
of directives to be abandoned is a proposed directive on compulsory
indication of nutritional values on the packaging of foodstuffs." 7 It strikes
me that, unless it is replaced with a directive on minimum acceptable
standards, this is precisely the sort of subject on which a Community-wide
rule is needed, in order to promote the internal market. In any event, it
seems likely that there will be lengthy disputes over how this principle
should be applied.

112.

Thomas R. Howell & Gregory I. Hume, Germany, in CONFLICT AMONG NATIONS, supra note

108, at 145, 201-02; GATT: Close to the Edge, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 19, 1991, at 76; The Uruguay
Round: Death by Procrastination,THE ECONOMIST, July 18, 1992, at 68.

113.
114.
115.

See generally Two-Speed Europe?,THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1992, at 14.
See supra text accompanying notes 3-5.
European Community: A Strange New Pattern of Stars, supra note 110, at 56.

116.

See generally supra note 98 and accompanying text.

117. Edinburgh European Council: Conclusions of the Presidency: Subsidiarity-Examples of
the Review of Pending Proposalsand ExistingLegislation, pt. A, annex 2, BULL. EC 12-1992, at 16, 17.
But see Council Resolution 93/C of 5 April 1993 on Future Action on the Labelling of Products in the
Interest of the Consumer, 1993 O.J. (C 1 10) 1 (general support for harmonized labelling requirements).
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Finally, there is a more subtle internal problem that will overshadow the
foregoing, and at least indirectly, occupy Community decisionmakers. That
problem is dealing with the consequences of what will inevitably be a larger
Community whose dominant member is Germany, where most new member
states will have more in common with Germany or at least Northern Europe,
than with Southern Europe." 8 All of this is likely to result in the
marginalization of France. The Community has gone as far as it can go in
admitting Latin countries; consequently, the influence of France, Italy,
Spain, and Portugal cannot expand. With the addition of Norway, Sweden,
Finland, and Austria, the influence of the Northern European countries will
clearly increase. Future additions from Eastern Europe will likely have the
same tilt.
The effect of these changes will be to reduce the influence of France in
the Community. Since the French role in the Community has been
paramount from the beginning, the reduction of French influence will have
profound, if unpredictable, results. I do not mean to suggest that France or
the southern bloc will suddenly lose all of their influence in the Community;
after all, three of the five largest EC members are in that bloc. Nonetheless,
much of that bloc is inherently in a weak position because of its desire for
aid from the rest of the Community." 9 Indeed, the French role in that
bloc might well be diminished because of a desire by the other four
Southern European states to receive increased aid, even if at the expense of
cuts in Community spending on the common agricultural policy, a priority
of France.
The effect of this evolution-the increase in German and northern
influence and the reduction in French influence-is hard to predict, but it
seems clear that decisionmaking in the Community will probably become
infinitely more complicated and difficult because of the changing FrancoGerman relationship. An inevitable consequence will be a more inwardlooking Community.
Thus, I would conclude that the decade ahead will see a stronger and
more independent EC, but also one which is more preoccupied with its
internal problems and those of Europe, and less interested in the rest of the
world and its problems.

118.
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Howell, supra note 108, at 395.
See supra note 45.
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B. The Effect on the U.S. of IncreasedEuropean Independence
and An Inward-Looking Europe
I see three major effects on the United States of increased European
independence and an inward-looking Europe. First, I believe that the EC
will increasingly object to U.S. unilateralism, which ultimately may affect
the way in which the United States goes about adopting trade statutes and
other laws with extraterritorial effects. Second, I think that the EC will
become more protectionist, with consequent impacts on the U.S. and world
economies. Third, I think that the EC will play less of a role in bringing the
countries of the third world into the modem world economy, leading to
increased pressures on the United States to play a more active role in this
regard.
1. EC Challenges to U.S. Unilateralism
As Europe becomes stronger and more united economically, it is likely
to be more aggressive in challenging U.S. attempts to impose U.S. views
internationally on trade and environmental issues. The United States in
recent years, in both areas (as well as others), has exhibited a tendency to
insist that all other countries comply with U.S. expectations or suffer
"punishment" by the United States. 120 A stronger, more independent
minded EC is likely to be more willing to engage in confrontational
activities, thereby worsening relations and making trade and other
agreements more difficult to reach.
In the trade area, the U.S. tendency toward unilateralism has been
exemplified by use of so-called Section 301, a provision of U.S. law that
authorizes the U.S. president to take punitive action against trade practices
of other nations that he determines to be objectionable.'
The Clinton
administration will be pressured to "strengthen" that provision in a way that
makes it even more confrontational, and there are indications that it will do
SO. 122

120.

See generally AGGREsSIvE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE
(Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990).

WORLD TRADING SYSTEM

121. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20.
122. Baucus Introduces Super 301 and Trade Compliance Bills, 10 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA),
at 195 (Feb. 3, 1993).
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A recent example of this type of U.S.-EC dispute arose in February,
when the United States threatened to retaliate against Europe because of a
three percent "Buy European" preference required to be imposed by member
states, in an EC directive on government procurement in the
telecommunications and certain other sectors.'23 This instance is a classic
example of the type of U.S. unilateralism that the EC detests. 24 There is
a GATT agreement on government procurement, negotiated mainly among
the EC, the United States, and Japan during GATT's Tokyo Round of
multilateral trade negotiations, but it does not cover the sectors dealt with
in the directive." 5
The U.S. view is that since the U.S.
telecommunications equipment market is open because it is privately owned,
the EC ought to open its market as well, even though it is largely
nonprivate, even though the United States did not succeed in negotiating
such market access in the Tokyo Round, and even though U.S. firms are
better off under the directive than they were before. The United States
argues essentially that it is unfair not to do things the U.S. way and that if
the Europeans do not, then the United States will retaliate. This attitude
causes great resentment in Europe, and one of the goals of the EC in the
Uruguay Round has been to get the United States to agree to limits on the
use of Section 301."6 This particular EC-U.S. dispute was partially
settled when the EC agreed to remove the three percent preference in respect
of utility procurement, but the United States still imposed some retaliatory
27
measures.
In the environmental area, the United States has sometimes taken a
similar tack, with the Marine Mammal Protection Act being one of the more

123. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Notice of Proposed Action, 58 Fed. Reg.
7163 (Feb. 4, 1993). The contested EC directive is Council Directive 90/531 of 17 Sept. 1990 on the
Procurement Procedures of Entities Operating in the Water, Energy, Transport and Telecommunications
Sectors, 1990 O.J. (L 297) 1. Article 29(2) permits a member state to reject a bid (a "nonCommunity
bid") if products originating in third countries exceed 50% of the total value of the products constituting
the bid. Article 29(3) requires that Community bids be favored over nonCommunity bids if the price
difference between them does not exceed 3%.
124, EC Commissioner for External Economic Affairs, Sir Leon Brittan, referred to the U.S.
action as "unilateral bullying." USTR Kantor Sets Plan to Sanction EC over 'Intolerable' Procurement
Law, 10 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), at 174 (Feb. 3, 1993).
125. See Agreement on Government Procurement, GATT, BISD 26th Supp. 33 (1980).
126. GA7T Council Uneasy About U.S. UnilateralTrade Policies, 9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA),
at 480 (Mar. 18, 1992).
127. 58 Fed. Reg. 30,391 (1993); Id. at 31,136.
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controversial examples. 2
Under that Act, the United States recently
barred imports of Mexican tuna because Mexican fisherman did not comply
with U.S. rules on avoiding injury to dolphins while tuna fishing. 2 9 A
GATT panel ruled that the United States had violated GATT by banning the
Mexican tuna, essentially because it felt that the United States had no right
to impose its idiosyncratic views on dolphin preservation on the rest of the
world (dolphins are not generally endangered; the U.S. legislation is
concerned more with the immorality of unnecessarily killing dolphins). 30
After the United States and Mexico reached an agreement to settle the issue
between them (by Mexico agreeing to follow U.S. practice), the EC brought
an action in GATT challenging the same U.S. practice.' 3 '
The EC's position and the GATT panel's view that these issues should
be decided multilaterally and not unilaterally is similar to the position taken
by the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development
(UNCED) in its Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, in
Principle 12, which provides:
Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a
disguised restriction on international trade. Unilateral actions to
deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the
importing countries should be avoided. Environmental measures
should,
addressing transboundary or global environmental problems
13 2
as far as possible, be based on international consensus.
From the viewpoint of the EC, this lends support to its view that U.S.
unilateralism should be controlled, and a more independent EC is likely to
make stronger efforts to do so."' Whether the United States will exercise

128. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988).
129. Notice of Embargo for Yellowfin Tuna, 56 Fed. Reg. 12,367 (1991).
130. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the Panel, GATT Doc. DS21/R
(Sept. 3, 1991).
131. The settlement is reported in Pro-DolphinAccord Made, N.Y. TIMEs, June 16, 1992, at D9.
The EC action is noted in GATT Focus, July 1992, at 2. No decision on the EC action has yet been
reported.
132. 31 1.L.M. 874, 878 (1992).
133. I support unilateralism in some cases. It was useful, for example, to get the Uruguay Round
started. But it should be used with discretion. It is one thing to use it to open markets, either those that
are closed in violation of GATT rules or those on which there is no agreement and in respect of which
the U.S. affords greater market access than the "target" country. It may be objectionable in other cases,
especially where it is tantamount to bullying by the United States. See generally William J. Davey,
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more restraint in following a policy of "aggressive unilateralism" and in
enacting extraterritorial laws remains to be seen.
2. EC Protectionism
A more independent and self-centered EC is likely to become more
protectionist in the coming decade. This result is likely because the
enlargement and integration of the EC market is going to place increased
competitive pressures on EC industries, and their likely reaction is going to
be to demand restrictive measures against imports from other countries.
This will be a particular problem because of the pressures to open the EC
market to East European countries. The price that likely will be exacted by
France and the other countries most negatively affected by this development
will be a more aggressive posture toward imports from other regions of the
world. 34
'
EC protectionism will also occur in the form of continued subsidization
of industry, by the EC itself, and by its member states. This, I suspect, will
be most controversial in agriculture, where even with the 1992 reforms, EC
subsidies will probably remain at significant levels. However, similar
problems will also arise elsewhere, since the United States and the EC have
fundamentally different views of the appropriateness of government
intervention in the economy.' 35 One recent example of this type of
controversy is the dispute over the subsidization of Airbus Industrie.'3 6
On the U.S. side, a new source of tension in trading relationships with
the EC will arise as it becomes more difficult for the United States to export
to the soon-to-be-expanding markets of Eastern Europe, because of the
preferential trade arrangements already entered into between the EC and

Section 301 and its Effect on the Multilateral Trading System, in TRADE LAWS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED STATES IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 165 (P. Demaret et al. eds.,
1989).
134. Howell, supra note 108, at 425-27.
135. Id. at 446-49.
136. For a description of this dispute, see Howell & Hume, supranote 112, at 197-99; Alan Win.
Wolff, The Failure of American Trade Policy, in CONFLICT AMONG NATIONS, supra note 108, at 469,
508-09. An agreement was reached in the summer of 1992. US., EC Sign Agreement Restricting
Subsidies to Civil Aircraft Industry, 9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), at 1243 (summary), 1273 (text) (July
22, 1992). The Clinton Administration has given conflicting signals as to whether or not it accepts the
agreement as settling the matter. PresidentClinton Vows Close Monitoring of US.-EC Pact on Aircraft
Subsidies, 10 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), at 294 (Feb. 24, 1993); Brittan Says EC has 'Assurances' that
U.S. does not Plan to Reopen Airbus Pact, 10 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), at 295 (Feb. 24, 1993).
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those countries. 137 The EC may lock in a lion's share of the markets of
the emerging new states of east and central Europe. Since these countries
will have preferential access to the EC market, and more importantly, since
they will give the EC preferential access to their markets, exporters in the
EC countries will have clear advantages in developing trading relationships,
even beyond the natural advantage of proximity.
Thus, a likely increase in protectionist policies in the EC, combined with
increased U.S.-EC trade friction, will lead to more frequent U.S.-EC
confrontations over trade issues.
3. The EC, the U.S., and North-South Relations
As the EC becomes more self-centered and protectionist, it is likely to
be less interested in the developing world. This is much more than a simple
matter of preoccupation. At the moment the EC is relatively generous in
giving aid to the third world; it has been less forthcoming in opening its
markets to industrial products from those countries.'
In the next decade, the EC will be hard pressed to expand its aid to the
third world, because of what it will likely view as more pressing needs in
Europe. The four poorest EC countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and
Spain) will continue to press for aid, as will the countries of Eastern Europe.
Germany will continue to be under pressure to finance the rebuilding of the
Eastern linder. In addition, to the extent that the EC market is going to be
opened to agricultural products or low cost industrial products, I expect the
market openings to come first in the case of trade with Eastern Europe,
since those countries are rapidly establishing closer formal trading
relationships with Europe than exist for developing countries.'3 9
The net impact of these trends will be that there will be less EC aid
money available for developing countries and fewer trading opportunities for
them. This is likely to result in more pressure being placed on the United
States to provide aid or serve as a market for the developing world. My
expectation is that the United States will do so for the countries of the

137. US. Official Warns EC Not To DiscriminateAgainst US. in Dealing with Eastern Europe,
7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), at 305 (Feb. 28, 1990).
138. See infra note 141.
139. As noted earlier, the Europe Agreements provide for more market integration than do the
EC's various association agreements. See supra text accompanying notes 64-76. There will also be a
desire to improve the economies of Eastern Europe so as to forestall migration pressures.
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western hemisphere and the Pacific Rim (as far west as Thailand), but that
it will not do so particularly for the rest of Asia and Africa. 4 ° Access to
markets is critical, as is so clearly demonstrated by the growth of the Pacific
Rim countries, the economic leaders of which (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Singapore, and now China) have benefitted greatly from their
141
significant access to the U.S. market.
The result will be an intensification of development problems in Africa
and areas of Asia, which have traditionally been areas of EC interest
because of past colonial ties, which will worsen North-South relations
generally. It also suggests that what seems to be the most effective form of
assistance to developing countries-access to markets 42 -will not be
much offered by the EC.
What will be the result of a more independent and self-centered EC
upon the United States and the rest of the world? The result will probably
be increased trade friction, as a result of the more confrontational
approaches to trade disputes between the United States and the EC predicted
above. At the outset, I should admit that I have in the past suggested that
a more confrontational approach may be desirable, because the parties will
see the folly of their ways when the stakes increase and reach a settlement
involving a range of issues. 143 I still subscribe to that view, but I suspect
that in the coming decade, the disputes between the EC and the United
States will be more difficult to resolve, which is to say that the stakes will
140. See, e.g., Steven A. Holmes, Africa, From the Cold War to Cold Shoulders, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 1993, at E4 (describing lack of U.S. interest in Africa and cuts in State Department staffing of
Africa-oriented positions).
141. Exports of those countries to the United States have been quite large in recent years,
especially compared to Europe.
1991 (Billions of U.S. dollars)
U.S.
EC
Japan
91.5
64.2
South Korea
17.0
9.7
Taiwan
23.0
13.8
Hong Kong
9.3
7.9
Singapore
10.0
6.5
China
19.0
18.6
ACP (69 countries)
N/A
23.7
U.S. statistics from 10 INrr'L TRADE REP. (BNA), at 348 (Feb. 24, 1993); EC statistics from EUROSTAT:
EXTERNAL TRADE & BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 12-92, at 2. EC statistics reported in ECU converted to
U.S. dollars at rate of $1=.807 ECU.
142. Schultz Warns That Failure of GA 7T Will Set Back Trade, Harm Developing Nations, 10
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), at 203 (Feb. 3, 1993).
143. See Davey, supra note 84, at 98-103; see also Davey, supra note 133.
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have to be quite high before they are resolved, which in itself is another way
of saying that small trade wars will break out.
The problem will be complicated if the Uruguay Round does not
succeed, or if whatever is salvaged from a failed Uruguay Round package
does not include a strengthened dispute settlement system.'" Such a
system could probably help cabin some of the excesses that may otherwise
be expected to occur in trade disputes between the United States and the EC.
However, it will be difficult for the United States to reach global trade
agreements with the EC in GATT. The EC was preoccupied with its own
internal problems during much of the Uruguay Round, which probably, in
part, explains the failure of the Round to conclude as expected. 145 If
Europe does, in fact, become more self-centered, as I suggest, it is not likely
that the EC will change its focus in the near future. The consequence of
this may well be that the United States and the EC will teeter on the edge
of trade wars with increasing frequency. This seems particularly likely,
given that the Clinton administration may be expected to follow a more
146
aggressive trade policy than did the Bush administration.
C. The 1992 Internal Market Program: A FortressEurope or
an Opportunityfor Multinationals?
From a more mundane perspective, one can ask simply whether the
completion of the EC's 1992 internal market program will lead to a
"Fortress Europe" antithetical to the interests of outsiders, or whether it
offers them an opportunity. As I have just indicated, there is a real
possibility that Europe will become more protectionist in the near future,
which obviously means that opportunities to export to Europe may be
adversely affected. However, this potential increase in protectionist behavior
is not a direct result of the creation of the internal market itself. Indeed, the
completion of the internal market, which had led to both increased

144. The reforms to the GATT dispute settlement system, proposed in the GATT DirectorGeneral's Draft Final Act for concluding the Uruguay Round (GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA, § S), are
in general reviewed favorably in William J. Davey, The GATT Dispute Settlement System: Proposals
for Reform in the Uruguay Round, Conference Series No. 21 at Chung-Hua Institution for Economic
Research (May 1992), in WORKSHOP ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS OF GATT: ISSUES
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROC ON TAIWAN, at 43.
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See supra text accompanying note 112.
Keith Bradshen, US. Turns Up Heat on Trade, N.Y.

TIMES, March 13, 1993, at L35.
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harmonization and mutual recognition of divergent national standards, makes
exporting to Europe easier. Moreover, from the point of view of the United
States and other multinationals with manufacturing facilities in Europe, the
single market process clearly benefits them. Indeed, to the extent that they
already think in European terms, they, in many cases, may benefit more than
EC companies. Thus, by itself, economic integration should make it easier
to export to Europe, although other developments in Europe (e.g., the trend
toward more independence and more introspection) could offset these
positive effects of economic integration. 4 7
There are two caveats to the above conclusion. Both concern the extent
to which foreign entities (or foreign controlled entities) may be subject to
discrimination. First, in some cases, there have been examples of explicit
discrimination against non-EC entities. Examples include the Television
Programming Directive, which imposes an obligation of indeterminate force
48
on EC broadcasters to use a minimum level of EC-origin programming.
Another example is the Second Banking Directive, which, in its draft form,
which, in its adopted
would have discriminated against U.S. banks, and
149
discrimination.
of
possibility
the
raises
still
form,
There is also the problem of indirect or disguised discrimination. The
internal market program has included a decision by the EC that much
harmonization can be done outside of the formal framework of EC
decisionmaking by standards setting organizations. 5 0 While this does not
necessarily mean that U.S. entities will be discriminated against, there is no
doubt that the standards set may favor European industries, since they will
have the most effective input into the standards setting process. While the
U.S. government has negotiated rights for U.S. entities to have some
participation rights, the United States generally does not have a very

147. Timothy J. Hauser, Acting Undersecretary for International Trade, U.S. Dept. of Commerce,
The European Community Single Market and U.S. Trade Relations, BUSINESS AMERICA, Mar. 8, 1993,
at 2.
148. Council Directive 89/552 of 3 October 1989 on the Coordination of Rules Concerning
Television Broadcasting Activities, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23; BERMANN, ET AL., supra note 10, at 567-68.
149. Second Council Directive 89/646 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and
Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions,
1989 O.J. (L 386) 1; BERMANN, ET AL., supra note 10, at 622.
150. Technical Harmonization and Standards: A New Approach, BULL. EC 1-1985, points 1.3 1-
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coordinated front on these issues, so that the possibility of discrimination
remains. i51

Another situation where there is potential for disguised discrimination
is a recent proposal for a directive on packaging waste. 2 The directive
may require, as a condition of importation, approval of an application for
access to a national waste management system, something that an EC based
to obtain more quickly and easily
company may be in a much better5position
3
than a small U.S. based exporter.
As to the effect on the U.S. market of EC integration, that market is so
large that I doubt that there will be significant new pressures to harmonize
U.S. practices and standards with EC practices and standards, except to the
extent that the EC rules become internationally recognized norms.
III. CONCLUSION

This article has reflected on some of the limits and effects of European
integration. An examination of the integration or globalization process in
Europe suggests that it has proceeded as far and as fast as it has because of
a high degree of commonality among its member states, and because of
strong institutions pushing integration forward. Nonetheless, even in Europe
there seem to be serious constraints on integration, particularly when the
integration process impinges on what might be called quality of life issues.
The effects of European integration in the future will be far-reaching.
In the medium term, I expect Europe to become more independent and selfabsorbed. This will likely lead to more EC-U.S. clashes over U.S.
unilateralism, greater protectionism in the EC, and a reduced EC role in
helping the countries of the third world. For U.S. companies trading into
and operating in Europe, the unification of the European market will
generally be beneficial.

151. BERMANN, ET AL., supra note 10, at 446-47.
152. Proposal for a Council Directive on Packaging and Packaging Waste, 1992 O.J. (C 263) 1.
153. See Commerce Department, US. Industry Analyze EC's Proposed Packaging Waste
Directive, BusINEss AMERICA, Jan. 25, 1993, at 20-21.

